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GENERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT  
IN THE TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM OF FAMILY FIRMS:  
EXPLORING NON-LINEAR EFFECTS ON ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The present study contends that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between generational 
involvement – i.e. the number of family generations simultaneously involved in the family firm 
top management team (TMT) – and entrepreneurial orientation (EO). Drawing on the upper 
echelons theory, we conceive generational involvement as a proxy of knowledge diversity in 
multigenerational family TMTs. We argue that while moderate levels of generational 
involvement stimulate task-related constructive conflicts for EO, increased kinship distance and 
relationship conflicts led by high levels of generational involvement are likely to undermine this 
potential advantage by damaging the relational context for EO. 
 
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO) – i.e. the sustained exhibition of firm-level entrepreneurial 
behavior (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011) - is a construct of central interest in management studies 
since the seminal work of Miller (1983). Its importance to firms’ survival and prosperity 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin & Frese 2009) opens up a quest for the 
identification of its determinants (Covin & Slevin, 1991; Zahra 1993). In particular, given that 
entrepreneurship is recognized to be a process of opportunity identification and exploitation 
carried out by those individuals holding managerial positions (Shane, 2003), much effort has 
been devoted to the identification of top management team (TMT)-related factors as antecedents 
of a firm’ entrepreneurial behavior. Specifically, scholars argue that TMT diversity or 
heterogeneity has the potential to provide a firm with positive outcomes, but prior studies have 
found mixed support for its effect on entrepreneurial activities (e.g. Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; 
Boeker, 1997a, 1997b). It is, thus, relevant to question whether increasing TMT diversity is a 
beneficial policy for EO. 
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In this study, we focus on TMT diversity and EO in family firms. As argued by Ling and 
Kellermanns (2010: 323), the family firm indeed offers “a rich avenue for research on diversity, 
since the family provides an additional layer of complexity and unique sources of TMT diversity 
not found in non-family firms.” Yet, although the world economy is dominated by this form of 
organization (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999) and EO is recognized to be a 
determinant of family firm resilience and long-term survival (Chrisman, Chua & Steier, 2011; 
Sharma & Salvato, 2011), only a few studies have empirically explored the effects of TMT 
diversity on family firms’ EO. Indeed, most of the family business literature focused on the 
effects of TMT diversity on behavioral dynamics (e.g. Ensley & Pearson, 2005) and financial 
performance (e.g. Ling & Kellermanns, 2010) rather than EO. In addition, most of the family 
business scholars considered the horizontal distance among family members (e.g. Ensley & 
Pearson, 2005) and between family and non-family members (Naldi, Nordqvist, Sjöberg & 
Wiklund, 2007; Cruz & Nordqvist, 2012) as major source of TMT diversity.  
Following Ling and Kellermanns (2010), we focus on the vertical distance among family 
members as source of TMT diversity: Generational involvement, i.e. the number of family 
generations simultaneously involved in the firm TMT (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Ling & 
Kellermanns, 2010). Specifically, generational involvement produces knowledge diversity (cf. 
Jehn, Northcraft & Neale, 1999; Milliken & Martins, 1996) due to the different expertise and 
perspectives that family members belonging to different generations bring to the team (Chirico, 
Sirmon, Sciascia & Mazzola, 2011; Ling & Kellermanns, 2010). Salvato (2004), Zahra (2005), 
Kellermanns and Eddleston (2006) and Kellermanns, Eddleston, Barnett and Pearson (2008) 
argue that generational involvement is positively related to entrepreneurial behavior. However, 
they hold a position that is somewhat in contrast with most literature, according to which family 
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firms are risk-averse and resistant to change (Jones, Makri & Gomez-Mejia, 2008; Gomez-
Mejia, Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Naldi et al., 2007; Short, 
Payne, Brigham, Lumpkin & Broberg, 2009).   
The present research intends to advance this debate and understand if and to what extent 
generational involvement fosters or hinders the family firm EO. Specifically, drawing on the 
upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), we hypothesize an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between generational involvement – a proxy of knowledge diversity in 
multigenerational family TMTs – and EO. We argue that moderate levels of generational 
involvement yield task-related constructive conflicts that foster knowledge integration and thus 
EO. However, high levels of generational involvement are likely to undermine this potential 
advantage because of increased kinship distance and disruptive relationship conflicts. 
With supportive empirical results, our research offers two main contributions. First, this 
study contributes to the debate on whether family involvement is conducive or not for EO, based 
on the level of generational involvement. Second, we cautiously add some knowledge to the 
TMT diversity literature by proposing a nonlinear relationship between an additional source of 
TMT diversity and entrepreneurship, thus shedding some light on previous mixed findings.  
TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM DIVERSITY AND  
ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION 
Upper echelon theory asserts that firm outcomes are a “reflection” of the actions of its 
TMT (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). The theory assumes that 
managers act on the basis of their cognitive frames, through which situations are differently 
interpreted and different actions are taken. These construals are a function of TMT members’ 
different education, experience, perspectives, values, affiliations and demographic 
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characteristics. It is argued that TMT diversity shapes the ideas and opportunities that are 
eventually pursued (Beckman, 2006), thus influencing a firm’s entrepreneurial activities and 
performance (Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007; Beckman et al., 2007; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; 
Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Accordingly, a wide literature on the effects of TMT diversity on 
strategic behaviors and outcomes has been developed (Zimmerman, 2008; Boone & Hendriks, 
2009). In particular, prior studies have addressed the effects of TMT diversity on innovation and 
EO, but this literature has not yet reached consistent results (e.g. Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; 
Boeker, 1997a, 1997b; Miller, Burke &Glick, 1998; O’Reilly, Snyder & Boothe, 1993; Talke, 
Salomo & Kock, 2011). From the different existing conceptualizations of EO, in this research, 
we adopt the seminal definition developed by Miller and Friesen (1982) and Miller (1983), that 
is the firm’s orientation towards product innovation, proactiveness and risk-taking.  
Some scholars support the idea that TMT diversity leads to the consideration of many 
alternatives and that this enhances the likelihood that innovative decisions will be made (Bantel 
& Jackson, 1989; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). TMT diversity should indeed lead to better 
problem solving and higher creativity and innovation because of the constructive dialogue built 
around top manager’s multiple ideas, knowledge and perspectives not available in homogeneous 
TMTs (Talke, Salomo & Rost, 2010; Talke et al., 2011). The most prominent benefit of a 
heterogeneous group is thus related to knowledge diversity (Milliken & Martins, 1996), defined 
as the different expertise and perspectives possessed by individuals in a given domain to perform 
a task or activity in a team (cf. Jehn et al., 1999; Postrel, 2002). Knowledge diversity highly 
stimulates task-related conflicts, i.e. productive debate and criticism about the content of the task 
being performed (Jehn, 1995; 1997; Jehn et al., 1999), which promote knowledge integration 
(Grant, 1996; Nonaka, 1994) and thus entrepreneurial action (Boeker, 1997a, 1997b). For 
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instance, Talke et al. (2011: 823) found that “top managers with diverse educational, functional, 
industry, and organizational backgrounds will combine different views of the world and have 
more constructive task conflicts, which encourages…a proactive innovation orientation of firm.” 
Also, Boeker (1997a, 1997b) found that heterogeneous TMTs are more likely to be 
entrepreneurial and enter new product markets than homogeneous teams. Similarly, Simons, 
Pelled and Smith(1999) suggest diversity in educational background and tenure can create 
alternative views and foster innovative choices. 
However, despite its merits, TMT diversity is also accompanied by costs. For instance, 
TMT diversity can produce high levels of relationship or emotional conflicts, i.e. “interpersonal 
incompatibilities among group members, which typically includes tension, animosity, and 
annoyance” (Jehn, 1995: 258) that undermine consensus and agreement, and thereby the 
potential entrepreneurial advantages of having a group with different knowledge and 
perspectives. Miller et al. (1998) for example found that more diverse TMTs make less 
comprehensive evaluations of opportunities and threats; and Knight et al. (1999) and Hambrick, 
Cho and Chen (1996: 664) showed that team heterogeneity is negatively related to strategic 
consensus and leads to “dispersion in the group’s perspective”, thus constraining or delaying 
entrepreneurial action.  Also, Ancona and Caldwell (1992) and O’Reilly et al. (1993), among 
others, found that TMT diversity decreases entrepreneurship. 
Such mixed results have induced most scholars to argue that TMT diversity is a ‘double-
edged sword’ (cf. Milliken & Martins, 1996) in which the “effect of TMT diversity on 
innovativeness [and entrepreneurship]” is “mixed and ambiguous because of the dual impact of 
the benefits and costs associated with TMT diversity” (Auh & Menguc, 2005: 250). TMT 
diversity apparently brings the necessary knowledge to bear on complex strategic issues, but it is 
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also likely to promote dysfunctional rivalries, impair social integration, and restrict knowledge 
flows – all of which serve to inhibit EO. In this research we aim to achieve a better 
understanding of this complexity and of the circumstances in which “potential benefits of diverse 
teams appear to be highly vulnerable to certain liabilities.” (Michie, Dooley & Fryxell, 2006: 
131).  
As such, we address this controversial topic by examining how EO is affected by the 
involvement in the TMT of managers who, although closely related through kinship ties, differ in 
their knowledge and perspectives based on the family generation they belong to. Specifically, we 
study TMT diversity and EO in family firms by focusing on an important source of knowledge 
diversity: generational involvement– i.e. the number of family generations simultaneously 
involved in the firm TMT (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006). Building on the work of Barkema 
and Shvyrkov (2007), we argue that generational involvement offers not only cognitive benefits 
(cf. task conflicts) but also relational obstacles (cf. relationship conflicts) for the development of 
EO. Accordingly, we adopt a nonlinear approach to the analysis of the relationship of interest, 
thus incorporating both cognitive and relational perspectives.  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Generational involvement has been recently depicted as “the family’s human capital spread 
across generations” (Chirico et al., 2011: 308) and thus as an important proxy of knowledge 
diversity in multigenerational family TMTs (Ling & Kellermanns, 2010). As discussed earlier, 
previous literature suggests that generational involvement in the TMT favors entrepreneurial 
behavior (Zahra, 2005; Kellermanns et al., 2008). Instead, we argue that the entrepreneurial 
potential of different degrees of generational involvement can be either realized or inhibited 
depending on the cognitive and relational dynamics existing in multigenerational family TMTs.   
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The advantage of generational involvement has a cognitive nature rooted in the different 
knowledge and perspectives of family managers belonging to different generations: Increased 
generational involvement yields groups of family managers with heterogeneous knowledge, as 
the knowledge and perspectives across generations tend to be more different than those within 
each generation, thus promoting constructive debate and entrepreneurship. This knowledge is 
also complementary as the individuals share some understandings of both the family and the 
business (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Family members’ common affiliation to the family and the 
business is also likely to create a ‘unified’ family group (cf. Ling & Kellermanns, 2010) and thus 
an ideal social context that supports knowledge integration (Chirico & Salvato, 2008; Patel & 
Fiet, 2011). Thus, although generational involvement may incorporate (and lead to) a certain 
degree of relationship conflicts, it more importantly provides a resource with the potential to 
stimulate task-related constructive conflicts that foster entrepreneurial initiatives (Kellermanns et 
al., 2008; Jehn, 1995; Zahra, 2005). 
In fact, while one generation “alone may find it difficult to have innovative ideas” 
(Salvato, 2004: 73), multiple generations are found to enhance knowledge diversity, animate 
debate and thus entrepreneurial behavior (Zahra, 2005; Kellermanns et al., 2008) through their 
constant “push for new ways of doing things” (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006: 813). For 
instance, Ling and Kellermanns (2010: 326) argue that when “younger generations enter the 
family firm, there is an increase in more entrepreneurial orientations.” Specifically, this potential 
is based on how heterogeneous knowledge in multigenerational family TMTs supports 
differences in the noticing and interpretation of cues for opportunities in the marketplace (Cruz 
& Nordqvist, 2012) as well as in the response needed to exploit these opportunities (Chirico, 
Ireland & Sirmon, 2011). When managers use heterogeneous knowledge and experience, they 
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can see problems from different angles and consequently arrive at more creative and innovative 
ideas through productive discussions around the tasks to be performed (Burgelman & Hitt, 2007; 
Fiol, 1994; Jehn, 1995).  
Accordingly, Kellermans, Zahra and colleagues (Ling & Kellermanns, 2010; 
Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Kellermanns et al., 2008; Zahra, 2005; Zahra et al., 2007) argue 
that increased generational involvement opens up a wider range of strategic options to be 
considered, so as to increase the novelty of strategic decisions. As a result, multigenerational 
family TMTs “become aware of more issues, perceive those issues differently, and are more 
likely to propose alternative courses of action.” (Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007: 666). Hence, task 
conflict leads TMT family groups to develop new ideas and perspectives (Jehn, 1995), which 
foster innovation and reduce the likelihood that strategic decisions will follow familiar path-
dependent patterns (Hambrick et al., 1996). To sum up, generational involvement provides 
knowledge diversity with the potential to increase the effective identification and assessment of 
opportunities as well as creative approaches to exploit them. 
On the other hand, when generational involvement in the TMT reaches high levels, 
family relationships may become more complicated, with conflicting family members’ business 
objectives, so as to inhibit and constrain the potential advantages of knowledge diversity among 
family members belonging to different generations. The disadvantage of generational 
involvement thus has a relational nature rooted in increased relationship conflicts among family 
members of different generations, which hamper constructive debate (i.e. task conflicts) and 
innovation. For instance, Kellermanns and Eddleston (2004) argue that not only do high levels of 
relationship conflicts have a devastating effect on a family firm’s outcomes, but they also 
prevent task conflicts from having a beneficial effect (see also Beckman et al., 2007). It is 
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therefore less likely that novel strategic options are proposed or considered by the entire TMT 
(Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007). 
Basically, the co-presence of many generations employed together increases the kinship 
distance among family managers, thus worsening not only the relational context but also the 
cognitive context –both needed for knowledge integration (Grant, 1996; Jehn, 1995, 1997). As 
Ensley and Pearson (2005: 269) explain “the greater kinship distance and dispersion of the 
family members in the familial teams will serve to dilute the strong central beliefs and ties of a 
more closely knit social group”. Such a situation prevents TMT members from integrating 
diverse sources of knowledge into innovative products making it increasingly difficult to assess, 
accept, and incorporate others’ ideas into successful innovative efforts. Relationship conflicts 
impede the building of consensus around organizational goals that is needed for a collaborative 
exchange of divergent points of view (Michie et al., 2006).  
In such a relational context, a reasonable strategic posture is to maintain the status quo, a 
course of action that does not require debate and provides familiarity for decision makers 
(Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007). Indeed, as generational involvement increases, each generation is 
likely to create its own comfort zone, such that path dependency along with resistance to 
flexibility will inhibit risk-taking and innovation. Building on the work of Miller (1993), Zahra 
(2005) suggests for instance that a family firm often evolves toward simplicity, in which 
“routines that worked well in the past are used again and again regardless of the strategic 
challenges facing the family firm” (Zahra, 2005: 24). This increases the risk of familiarity traps, 
which tend to convert a formula for success into a path toward failure (Ahuja & Lampert, 2001; 
Miller, 1993). Thus, the emphasis shifts more to taking decisions and addressing problems based 
on past behaviors rather than identifying and exploiting new opportunities. Family firms 
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replicate inherited organizational routines and strategic perspectives, especially if the resources 
in question contributed to prior success (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). This rigidity prevents the 
business from having the flexibility to adapt when situations change, so that the family firm 
tends to view entrepreneurial behavior as a threat (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006).  
Consequently, we argue that while moderate levels of generational involvement in the 
TMT provide the cognitive condition for entrepreneurship, increased kinship distance and 
relationship conflicts led by high levels of generational involvement are likely to undermine this 
potential advantage by damaging the relational context. Our argument leads us to assume the 
existence of a U-shaped relationship between generational involvement in the TMT and EO. In 
formal terms: 
Hypothesis: An inverted U-shaped relationship exists between the number of generations 
involved in the top management team and entrepreneurial orientation. Moderate levels of 
generational involvement are associated with the highest level of entrepreneurial 
orientation. 
METHODOLOGY 
Data for this study were collected by means of a survey of 199 Swiss family firms. To 
select firms for the survey, we identified all the companies registered with the Chamber of 
Commerce in Canton Ticino, located in Switzerland’s Italian-speaking region. This provided a 
sampling frame of 967 firms. Then, following Zahra (2005) and Miller, Le Breton-Miller & 
Scholnick (2008), we determined whether the firms were family-owned by multiple family 
members of the same family (the majority of equity owned by the family) or not. A total of 592 
firms were family firms. We sent the survey to these firms, and we received 199 usable 
responses, a response rate of 33.61%. We compared the respondents’ size, age, and industry with 
those of non-respondents, and found no statistically significant differences.  
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The survey targeted the firms’ two highest executives (the CEO and the next-highest senior 
position). We addressed inter-respondent reliability by correlating the responses per firm. The 
result indicates significant inter-respondent reliability (Interclass Correlation Coefficient = .776; 
p < 0.001). Regarding generational involvement, we found differences in only a few cases. When 
a mismatch occurred, we personally called the firm to obtain the accurate data. Next, we 
addressed the issue of common methods bias in several ways. First, we used the first 
respondent’s data regarding EO for our analysis. Also, we ran the regression analysis by using 
the second respondent’s data of EO and results did not differ substantially from our reported 
analyses. We also took two additional steps to mitigate any remaining concerns related to 
common methods bias. First, we used Harman’s one-factor test on items included in our 
regression model. The results showed six factors with eigenvalues higher than 1, accounting for 
65.130% of the variance. The first factor explained 24.498% of the variance, and the remaining 
factors accounted for 40.63%. This analysis shows that the factors structure is not an artifact of 
the measurement process (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). Second, we used objective secondary data 
for size, age and industry.  
We developed the survey in a series of steps. The questionnaire was first pilot-tested on 
six senior executives belonging to three family firms (two from each firm), and on five 
academics, whose expertise focuses on research methodology and family firms. Next, the refined 
instrument was piloted again on a larger convenience sample of 53 family firms, and final 
revisions were made. These revision efforts created an instrument that provides high reliability. 
While several measures of EO exist, we relied on the widely used instrument developed 
by Miller (1983). The 7-item scale accounts for product innovation, risk taking and proactiveness 
(= 0.87). This choice increases the comparability of our findings, given that the majority of 
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empirical research has employed this approach (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011). In order to measure 
generational involvement, we asked the respondents to report the number of generations (one, 
two, three, or more than three) simultaneously involved in the management of the firm (see 
Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; Zahra, 2005).  
We controlled for eight variables (age, size, number of family members on the TMT, 
percentage of family members on the TMT, environmental dynamism, R&D Investments, 
industry and performance). First, because the age of a firm may affect its entrepreneurial efforts 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992), we controlled for age by measuring the number of years the firm had 
been in existence1. Second, because access to external resources is easier for larger firms, and 
this access can affect entrepreneurship (Zahra & Nielsen, 2002), we controlled for size by 
measuring the number of full-time employees. Third, we controlled for the number of family 
members on the TMT given that the difficulties associated with increasing generational 
involvement could be related with the number of family members on the TMT (Zahra, 2005). In 
fact, the minimum number of family members automatically rises when there is one, two, three, 
or more generations involved. Fourth, we controlled for percentage of family members on the 
TMT, given that it is recognized that non-family professional managers may bring more 
objectivity to the decision-making process and thereby encourage entrepreneurial decisions 
(Salvato, Chirico & Sharma, 2010). Fifth, because firms that operate in dynamic environments 
are likely to be technology-intensive and thus need to systematically explore entrepreneurial 
opportunities, we controlled for dynamism (Zahra & Bogner, 2000), and measured it with a 
                                                 
1 Additionally, given that the level of a family-firm EO may differ according to the generation in charge of the 
business (Salvato, 2004; Kellermanns & Eddleston 2006), as robustness check, we also ran the analyses controlling 
for generation in control. This variable was not statistically significant and its inclusion did not change the other 
results. Yet, as expected, generation in control was highly correlated with firm age (0.841; p<0.001). As an 
additional check, we again ran the analysis excluding firm age, while keeping generation in control. Again, 
generation in control was not statistically significant and its inclusion did not substantively change our results. These 
additional analyses reveal that generation in control does not have a significant impact on family firm EO and, 
therefore, it was not included as a control variable in the analyses we report. 
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three-item index (see Jansen, Van Den Bosch & Volberda, 2005: 1006) (= 0.80). Sixth, we also 
controlled for R&D investment, which reflects a company’s ability to acquire external knowledge 
and exploit it internally for entrepreneurial proposes (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) (= 0.79). 
Seventh, because industries may differentially encourage companies to develop new and 
innovative products, take risks, and be more proactive, we controlled for industry type. Finally, a 
firm’s performance is expected to increase entrepreneurship (Zahra & Nielsen, 2002), so, we also 
controlled for performance through four related financial items regarding net profit, sales 
growth, cash flow, and growth of net worth (= 0.85). Respondents were asked to compare their 
level of performance relative to their main competitors in the last three years. We used a 5-point 
scale ranging from 'much lower' to 'much higher (Naldi et al., 2007; Wiklund & Shepherd, 
2003)2.  
RESULTS 
Regression analysis was utilized for hypothesis testing and the descriptive statistics and 
correlations of the study’s variables are presented in Table 1. Inspection of the variance inflation 
factors showed that multicollinearity was not a concern (lower than 5; Hamilton, 2006). Also, to 
test for heteroscedasticity, we screened the data with the help of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test (2(1)=2.02; prob>2=0.1530) and the White test (2=74.83; p=0.3554). Both tests 
indicated that heteroscedasticity was not an issue in our study (Hamilton, 2006).  
Additionally, we also controlled the potential for endogeneity in our model by using a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) approach in STATA with multiple instrumental variables (Sirmon & 
Hitt, 2009). Instrumental variables are used to compute estimated values of the problematic 
predictor(s) (generational involvement) in the first stage, and then those computed values are 
                                                 
2 EO, performance and dynamism were operationalized by adding the scale items of each construct and then 
dividing them by the number of items. 
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used to estimate a linear regression model of the dependent variable (EO) in the second stage. 
However, to be effective (i.e., not weak) an instrumental variable should not be correlated with 
the dependent variable(s) predicted in the second stage, but should be correlated with the 
potential endogenous variable(s) predicted in the first stage (Kennedy, 2008; Wooldridge, 2002). 
We identified ‘generational ownership dispersion’ and ‘generation in control’ as instrumental 
variables meeting these criteria.  
2SLS approach with our data yielded similar results to the ordinary least squares approach. 
However, the results of STATA’s ‘ivendog’ command – which tests for endogeneity through the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test and the Wu-Hausman F test (Kennedy, 2008; Wooldridge, 
2002) – showed that endogeneity was not a concern in our study (Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq 
test: 0.98373 Chi-sq(1), p-value = 0.32128; Wu-Hausman F test: 0.90335 F(1,180), p-value = 
0.34316) 3. We finally tested our hypothesis in three models (Table 2).  
“Insert Tables 1 and 2 here” 
Model 1 includes only the control variables. In model 2, EO was also regressed on 
generational involvement in the TMT. In model 3 generational involvement squared was added 
in order to test our hypothesis, which predicted a non-linear relationship between generational 
involvement and EO in family firms. Although generational involvement appeared not to be 
significantly related to EO in Model 2 (-.042; ns); in Model 3 generational involvement revealed 
a positive and significant coefficient (.211; p<.05), while generational involvement squared was 
negative and significant(-.309; p<.01). Thus, the analytical results supported our hypothesis. 
Further, to check for the robustness of this significant non-linear effect, we also performed the 
joint F-test that assesses whether generational involvement and generational involvement 
                                                 
3 The two instrumental variables also individually (see Makri, Hitt & Lane, 2010; Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt & 
Holcomb, 2007) supported this result of exogeneity. 
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squared jointly have a significant effect on EO. The joint F-test further supported our hypothesis 
(F(2,179)=3.71; Prob> F =0.0263) (Hamilton, 2006). 
Lastly, because the components of EO are often tested separately, we ran a post-hoc 
analysis to assess the robustness of our results. Specifically, we separately tested the effect of 
generational involvement and each of the components of EO (i.e. product innovation, 
proactiveness, and risk taking). Results were substantively similar for both product innovation 
(generational involvement: .279, p<.05; generational involvement2: -.430, p<.001) and 
proactiveness (generational involvement: .253, p<0.05; generational involvement2: -.319, p<.01); 
but not for risk taking (generational involvement: -.007, ns; generational involvement2: -.007, 
ns). 
DISCUSSION  
TMT diversity is something of a double-edged sword to be approached through a cognitive 
and a relational perspective. Where there is diversity, teams enter into debate due to their 
different perceptions and the range of possible strategic options. Rather than accepting existing 
strategies, heterogeneous teams are likely to engage in task conflicts (cf. cognitive perspective), 
fuelled by their different knowledge and perspectives. However, task conflict is difficult to 
manage productively, especially when increased relationship conflicts are at stake. When people 
are faced with high TMT diversity, they must work with individuals who they do not easily 
interrelate with or understand (cf. relational perspective), which increases the uncertainty 
associated with their entrepreneurial actions (cf. Barkema & Shvyrkov, 2007). 
We focus on generational involvement – a proxy of knowledge diversity in 
multigenerational family TMTs –  and adopt a nonlinear approach to better explicate both the 
cognitive and relational perspectives associated with TMT diversity. Specifically, our empirical 
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results confirm that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between generational involvement 
and EO. The highest level of EO is achieved when two generations are involved, rather than only 
one. Indeed, involving a second generation in the TMT enriches family managers’ knowledge 
and perspectives, thus promoting constructive debate, knowledge integration and EO. 
Apparently, while relationship conflicts are mitigated, task conflicts are promoted when two 
generations are simultaneously involved in the TMT. For instance, Ensley and Pearson (2005) 
argue that the presence of parents – as usually happens when two generations are involved – 
inhibits relationship conflicts and promotes cohesion. However, when three generations are 
involved and thus the kinship distance increases further, the cognitive advantages are overcome 
by increased social relational conflicts and path dependent behaviors that undermine 
entrepreneurial efforts.  As Gersick, Davis, Hampton and Lansberg (1997) contend, as familial 
distance increases, the values, beliefs and consensus of the family become more diluted and thus 
family relationships become more complicated. 
Our result thus confirms that knowledge diversity among family members belonging to 
different generations may enhance some beneficial dynamics but impair others depending on the 
number of generations involved in the TMT. Put differently, the cognitive endowment can 
become a liability when the relational context decays, with EO suffering as a result. Accordingly, 
Beckman et al. (2007: 154) clearly explain that team diversity produces negative outcomes 
“when the potential conflict in group dynamics [i.e. relationship conflicts] outweighs the 
information benefits from different perspectives [i.e. task conflicts]”. Thus, unless the costs 
associated with relationship conflicts are attenuated, the benefits of task conflicts on 
entrepreneurship will suffer as a result (Hambrick et al., 1996). 
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Furthermore, a closer look at the control variables in our model shows that the percentage 
of non-family members on the TMT significantly and positively impacts on EO. This finding 
confirms that having non-family members on the TMT, besides increasing the TMT diversity, 
offers some more “rationality” and “objectivity” in decision making that may mitigate potential 
family relationship conflicts, increase the level of professionalization in the business, and thus 
promote change and innovation4 (Cruz & Nordqvist, 2012). As Salvato et al. (2010) argue, non-
family managers dramatically improves the quality of strategic decisions and the likelihood of 
entrepreneurial behaviors. In addition, under the light of agency theory, family owner-managers 
tend not to risk the family’s wealth and jeopardize the financial and social well-being of future 
generations (Naldi et al., 2007). Therefore, limiting their involvement by opening the TMT to 
non-family members may be beneficial for EO.    
Finally, although our hypothesis is supported for both product innovation and 
proactiveness, it is not for risk-taking. This confirms that risk-taking is a distinct dimension of 
family firms’ entrepreneurial behavior – as Naldi et al. (2007) hold. Such a position is in line 
with more recent theorizing according to which the dimensions of EO may occur in different 
combinations, each representing a different and independent aspect (e.g., Covin, Green & Slevin, 
2006).  
Two important contributions emerge from the present research. First, our study 
contributes to the literature of entrepreneurship in family firms, by clarifying the effect of 
generational involvement on EO. We show how generational involvement in the TMT – often 
identified as a positive correlate of entrepreneurship (e.g. Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006; 
Zahra, 2005), not always has a positive effect on EO. .As such, our work sheds some light on 
previous studies that offered conflicting results regarding the effect of generational involvement 
                                                 
4 We thank one of the anonymous reviewers and the editor for this insightful comment. 
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on EO. More generally speaking, we contribute to the debate on the implications of family 
involvement on EO, by analyzing the effects of a specific form of family involvement – i.e. 
generational involvement – on entrepreneurial behavior and by looking for non-linear effects, 
rather than simple linear relationships.  
Second, we cautiously add some knowledge to the literature on TMT diversity by 
proposing a non-linear approach to explain the relationship between TMT diversity and 
entrepreneurship. In fact, we use both the cognitive and relational perspectives to elucidate 
previous research showing mixed effects of TMT diversity on entrepreneurial activities (e.g. 
Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Boeker, 1997a, 1997b). Results further support and extend recent 
literature concluding that “it is impossible to assume a pure, simple relationship between TMT 
diversity and firm” outcomes (Talke et al., 2011: 908). With respect to this literature stream we 
also analyze a specific source of diversity in the TMT, i.e. the vertical distance among family 
members, thus complementing previous research that focused on the horizontal distance among 
family members (e.g. Ensley & Pearson, 2005).    
Several future research routes can be traced on the basis of the limitations of this 
research. First, we do not directly measure task and relationship conflicts, but argue that they are 
crucial for EO efforts. Future studies should incorporate these constructs in a multi-level research 
design. Second, we limit our study to only generational involvement as source of TMT 
knowledge diversity and assume that family members’ knowledge is more similar within a 
generation rather than between generations. Future research may investigate if also other sources 
of TMT diversity impact EO in a non-linear way. We limited our study to the vertical distance 
among family members but horizontal distance as source of TMT diversity in family firms may 
affect EO in a similar vein. Further investigation is clearly required. Third, the TMTs of our 
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firms are mainly dominated by family members (the average percentage of non-family managers 
in our sample was only 24.1%; see Table 1). This condition raises some relevant provocative 
questions: for instance, would our result be different if the percentage of family and non-family 
managers was more balanced in our sample? Or if the TMT was dominated by non-family 
managers? Future research clearly needs to be channeled also towards these directions. Fourth, 
the validity of the analysis is limited by the cross-sectional nature of the study. A longitudinal 
research design could provide further evidence on the causal relationships between dependent 
and independent variables. Fifth, our data were collected exclusively in Switzerland: Given that 
EO is specifically bounded to cultural contingencies (Arbaugh, Cox & Camp, 2005), a multi-
country study that investigates the contingency effects of cultural influences is desirable.  
In conclusion, our results suggest that generational involvement is essential for family firm 
EO, which implies that family generations must accept each other’s knowledge to be successful 
over time. Also, our work suggests family owners and managers to limit the involvement of 
family generations to two, given the relational inefficiencies that three generations involved in 
the TMT may generate.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Mean SD 1 2. 3.  4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. Age 46.270 39.385 1                
2. Size 92.332 738.39 .82 1               
3. # of FM on TMT 1.909 0.949 .088 -.061 1              
4. % non-FM on TMT 0.241 0.301 .38 0.125 -.235** 1             
5. Dynamism 3.266 .722 -.064 -.166* -.016 -.105 1            
6. R&D Investments 3.688 .818 -.095 -.026 -.082 .114 .118 1           
7. Electronics/Inf.  .040 .196 -.102 -.023 -.034 -.054 .102 -.110 1          
8. Trade .246 .431 .175* -.052 -.032 .021 .080 -.010 -.117 1         
9. Construction .140 .348 .117 -.035 .130 -.113 -.002 -.023 -.083 -.231** 1        
10. Manufacturing .196 .397 .150* -.028 .087 .117 -.106 .080 -.101 -.282** -.200** 1       
11. Transp. & Comm. .030 .171 .033 -.013 -.076 -.060 .016 .031 -.036 -.101 -.071 -.087 1      
12. Finance .015 .122 -.064 -.014 -.075 -.031 -.027 -.054 -.025 -.071 -.050 -.061 -.022 1     
13. Services  .211 .409 -.233** .164* -.107 .052 .014 .001 -.106 -.296** -.209** -.255** -.091 -.064 1    
14. Others .090 .287 -.128 -.033 -.044 -.010 -.003 .035 -.065 -.180* -.128 -.156* -.056 -.039 -.163* 1   
15. Performance 3.918 .563 -.038 -.069 .036 -.110 .075 .303** -.243** -.031 .046 -.092 .065 .201* .064 .100 1  
16. EO 3.596 .639 -.083 .009 -.016 .119 .329** .254** .078 -.077 -.110 .083 .059 .088 -.020 .129 .252** 1 
17. Generational Invol. 1.540 .548 .217** -.043 .181* -.061 -.066 -.019 -.155* .057 .078 .001 .095 -.046 -.058 -.118 .053 -.103 
N= 199; * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
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Table 2: Results of Regression on Entrepreneurial Orientation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N= 199 
+ p<.10 * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
Controls Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Age -.029 -.022 -.017 
Size .004 .011 .025 
# of FM on TMT .060 .064 .065 
% non-FM on TMT .166* .164* .153* 
Dynamism .304*** .303*** .291*** 
R&D Investments .134+ .133+ .165* 
Electronics/Informatics .237* .224* .210* 
Trade .196 .178 .136 
Construction .131 .117 .061 
Manufacturing .315* .296+ .259 
Transport. & Comm. .155+ .151 .118 
Finance .143+ .137+ .130+ 
Services  .213 .196 .147 
Others .272* .257* .227+ 
Performance .210** .211** .191** 
    
Gener. Inv.   -.042 .211* 
Gener. Inv. squared     -.309** 
    
    
Change in R2 .271*** .001 .028** 
R2 .271 .272 .300 
Adjusted R2 .210 .208 .233 
F 4.481*** 4.209*** 4.509*** 
